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I. INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the recent development of vast shale gas 
formations across the United States, natural gas has been 
heralded as the “bridge fuel” that will satisfy our nation’s energy 
demand as we transition from dependence on “dirty” fossil fuels 
to a cleaner energy future.  However, as drilling and production 
activities have become increasingly prominent across the country, 
particularly in areas not accustomed to prolonged surface 
operations, significant environmental issues regarding 
exploration and production activities have been grabbing 
headlines.  While environmental issues regarding hydraulic 
fracturing have been getting most of the public’s attention 
recently, a battle concerning the aggregation of oil and gas 
facilities into a single source for air permitting purposes is quietly 
being fought between operators, state permitting authorities, and 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
 
*  Steven Lord practices Oil & Gas Law and Environmental Law at the Kilburn 
Law Firm, PLLC in Houston, TX.  He obtained his J.D. from Loyola University 
New Orleans College of Law and has an LL.M. in Energy, Environmental and 
Natural Resources Law from the University of Houston Law Center. 
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In 1980, EPA promulgated a definition for “stationary 
sources” that were to be regulated under the Clean Air Act’s 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration program.1  The definition 
essentially set out a three-factor test to determine if separate 
facilities could be aggregated into a single source for permitting 
purposes.2  However, for three decades, the definition was 
inconsistently applied to oil and gas facilities.  In 2007, EPA 
issued a guidance document clarifying the issue.3  Nevertheless, 
EPA revoked that guidance document in 2009, and the issue of 
how EPA’s definition of “stationary source” should be applied to 
oil and gas exploration and production facilities has never been 
more uncertain. 
This article examines the issues concerning source 
determinations for oil and gas exploration and production 
facilities.  Part II outlines relevant Clean Air Act programs.  Part 
III discusses the regulatory history of EPA’s definition of 
“stationary source” and the development of the Agency’s 
aggregation policy, followed by application of that policy in recent 
source determinations.  Part IV gives an overview of the 
aggregation regulations and policies from various oil and gas 
producing states.  Part V provides criticism of EPA’s aggregation 
policy and its interpretation of the “contiguous or adjacent” factor 
in the definition of source.  Additionally, this section provides the 
basis for a court challenge of EPA’s interpretation of “contiguous 
or adjacent.”  Finally, Part VI briefly discusses EPA’s New Source 
Review circumvention policy and how it affects oil and gas 
facilities. 
 
 1. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 124). 
 2. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(6) (2012). 
 3. See Memorandum from William L. Wehrum, NOAA Office of Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Research, to EPA Regional Admin. I-X, Source Determinations for 
Oil and Gas Industries (Jan. 12, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Wehrum Memo]. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/1
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II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT CLEAN AIR ACT 
PROVISIONS 
In response to the growing national perception that air 
pollution was a serious national problem, Congress enacted the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1970.4  At the heart of the ambitious 
program were federally promulgated National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) and state-adopted plans to 
implement those standards.  The CAA requires the EPA to 
promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
for “criteria” pollutants.5 
The primary means of achieving the NAAQS is a system of 
preconstruction review and permitting requirements for new 
emissions sources and modifications to existing emissions 
sources.  This system is known as the New Source Review (NSR) 
program, which has three subparts.  The first two apply to large 
or “major” sources of air pollution: the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) program under Part C of Title I,6 and the 
Nonattainment Area (NAA) program under CAA Section 173 and 
other provisions in Part D of Title I.7  The third subpart of the 
NSR program consists of state programs that apply to smaller or 
“minor” sources of air pollution, and these vary from state to 
state.8  The CAA requires NSR analysis before the construction of 
any new major stationary source or the major modification of an 
existing major stationary source.9 
In the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress enacted 
Title V of the CAA, creating a federally mandated operating 
permit program to be implemented by the states.10  A Title V 
permit contains every federally enforceable air pollution 
 
 4. Clean Air Act (CAA), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
 5. CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2012). 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470—7492 (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 51.160 (2002); 40 C.F.R 
§ 52.21 (2002) 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501—7515. 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C) (Requiring states to implement 
preconstruction state permit programs that apply to sources that do not meet or 
exceed “major source” thresholds in order to assure that the NAAQS are met.  
Note that there is substantial variation among state permit programs.). 
 9. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(1)(i); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503. 
3
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requirement that applies to a particular source.11  A Title V 
operating permit generally does not impose new substantive air 
quality control requirements to a stationary source; rather, it is 
primarily a procedural requirement.  By consolidating the various 
permit requirements applicable to a stationary source in one 
document, the Title V program enables EPA, states, and citizens 
to better understand the requirements applicable to a source and 
whether the source is meeting those requirements. 
III. SOURCE AGGREGATION 
A. Origins 
The CAA’s PSD program applies to certain types of 
“stationary sources” that emit or could emit 100 tons per year 
(tpy), or “any other source” that emits or could emit 250 tpy, of 
any regulated air pollutant.12  It should also be noted that, as of 
July 1, 2011, Step 2 of EPA’s “Tailoring Rule” went into effect, 
and PSD and Title V permitting requirements now apply to new 
stationary sources that emit at least 100,000 tpy of greenhouse 
gases, even if they do not exceed permitting thresholds for any 
other pollutant.13  Significantly, the CAA does not specifically 
define the terms “stationary source” and “any other source” in the 
PSD provisions of the Act.  To fill the statutory gap, EPA defined 
these terms when it promulgated its comprehensive CAA 
regulations in 1978.  Shortly thereafter, several industry groups 
and intervenors challenged EPA’s definition of “source” in 
Alabama Power v. Costle.14  Siding with the petitioners, the D.C. 
Circuit in Alabama Power held that the definition of “source” is 
limited to the four terms defining stationary source in Section 
111(a)(3) of the CAA for the New Source Performance Standards 
(NSPS) program: building, installation, structure, or facility.15  
The Court of Appeals went on to state, “EPA has discretion to 
 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(a), 7661c(a). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7479(a) (defining “major 
emitting facility”). 
 13. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009). 
 14. See Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 15. Id. at 395. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/1
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define statutory terms reasonably so as to carry out the expressed 
purpose of the (CAA),” and that EPA could reasonably interpret 
the terms “facility” and “installation” broad enough to cover an 
entire plant.16  However, when the Court of Appeals addressed 
the issue of whether the definition of “source” included industrial 
units joined by contiguity and common ownership, it ruled that 
EPA could not aggregate units as a single source “unless they fit 
within the four permissible statutory terms.”17  Thus, the Court 
of Appeals in Alabama Power limited EPA’s discretion to 
interpret the definition of “stationary source.” 
EPA responded to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Alabama 
Power by promulgating a new definition of stationary source in 
the preamble to the 1980 PSD Regulations.18  EPA defined 
stationary source as “any building, structure, facility, or 
installation which emits or may emit a regulated NSR 
pollutant.”19  EPA defined building, structure, facility, or 
installation as “all of the pollutant-emitting activities which [1] 
belong to the same industrial grouping, [2] are located on one or 
more contiguous or adjacent properties, and [3] are [under 
common ownership or control].”20  Thus, EPA created a three-
factor test to determine if different pollutant-emitting activities 
at a particular site may be aggregated for major source 
determination.  It is important to note that if any one of these 
criteria is not met, the pollutant-emitting activities cannot be 
aggregated. 
As in the first factor described above, all pollutant-emitting 
activities, or emissions units, must belong to the same industrial 
grouping in order to be aggregated.  “Same industrial grouping” 
means the industrial groups identified by the same two-digit 
codes in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Manual 
published by the Office of Management and Budget.21  However, 
 
 16. Id. at 396. 
 17. Id. at 396-97. 
 18. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 124). 
 19. 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(b)(5) (2011). 
 20. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(6). 
 21. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(6). 
5
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a frequent problem in source determination arises when there are 
multiple emissions sources at a large industrial complex that do 
not fall under the same two-digit SIC Code.  In this situation, the 
1980 PSD Preamble provides that each emissions unit is 
classified according to the primary activity at the site, which is 
determined by the site’s principle product or services that it 
renders.22  Facilities that convey, store, or otherwise assist in 
production of the principle product are called “support 
facilities.”23  Although support facilities might not share the same 
SIC Code with the primary facility, they are considered part of 
the “same industrial grouping” for the purpose of source 
determination. 
The EPA has provided guidance on when it considers 
emissions units that are not part of a site’s primary activity to be 
a support facility.24  EPA presumes a support facility relationship 
to exist “where more than fifty percent of the output services 
provided by one facility is dedicated to another facility that it 
supports.”25  However, a number of financial, functional, 
contractual, or other factors may allow a permitting authority to 
make a support facility determination when the fifty percent test 
is not met.  These factors include: 
(1) the degree to which the supporting activity receives materials 
or services from the primary activity (which indicates a mutually 
beneficial arrangement between the primary and secondary 
activities); (2) the degree to which the primary activity exerts 
control over the support activity’s operations; (3) the nature of 
any contractual arrangements between the facilities; and (4) the 
reasons for the presence of the support activity on the same site 
as the primary activity (e.g., whether the support activity would 
exist at that site but for the primary activity).26 
 
 22. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. at 52,695. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Letter from JoAnn Heiman, EPA Region 7, to James Pray, at 4 (Dec. 6, 
2004) (on file with author). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/1
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Thus, a support facility analysis involves an in-depth review of 
the primary activity’s operational or functional dependence on the 
secondary activity.  However, it is important to note that the 
above-described support facility analysis only applies when the 
facilities at issue have different SIC codes.  The other parts of the 
three-factor aggregation test – contiguous or adjacent and 
common control – must also be met in a support facility analysis 
to combine emissions units into a single major source. 
When defining a source, there are three overarching 
principles that guide a permitting authority when conducting an 
aggregation analysis.  Significantly, EPA stated in the 1980 PSD 
Preamble that the Alabama Power decision set the following 
boundaries on the definition of the four component terms of 
“source” (i.e., building, facility, structure, and installation): “(1) it 
must carry out reasonably the purposes of PSD; (2) it must 
approximate a common sense notion of a ‘plant;’ and (3) it must 
avoid aggregating pollutant-emitting activities that as a group 
would not fit within the ordinary meaning of ‘building,’ 
‘structure,’ ‘facility, or ‘installation.’”27  Accordingly, as in 
Alabama Power and the 1980 PSD Preamble, the above-described 
boundaries serve as guiding principles that EPA must use when 
applying its three-factor test for major source determinations. 
B. The Rise of “Functional Interdependence” 
An ongoing issue in NSR is how to define “stationary source” 
in an oil or gas field.  Pipelines physically interconnect oil and gas 
production and gathering facilities, and there is a common 
product.  Although individual emission units in an oil or gas field 
generally do not exceed major source emissions thresholds, the 
aggregate total of an entire oil or gas field generally does.  
Moreover, there are numerous pieces of equipment that can be 
located miles apart and operate independently.  Thus, a source of 
consternation for much of the oil and gas industry is how to 
 
 27. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,694-95 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 
and 124). 
7
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determine if separate emissions sources in a field can be 
aggregated under the three-part test for source determination. 
When applying the three-part test, the most contentious 
factor has been whether two or more facilities in an oil or gas 
field are “contiguous or adjacent.”  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“contiguous” as “[t]ouching at a point or along a boundary; 
adjoining;”28 and “adjacent” as “[l]ying near or close to, but not 
necessarily touching.”29  The 1980 PSD Preamble states, “EPA is 
unable to say precisely at this point how far apart activities must 
be in order to be treated separately,” and that it “can answer that 
question only through case-by-case determinations.”30  However, 
the Preamble provides that EPA does not “intend ‘source’ to 
encompass activities that would be many miles apart along a 
long-line operation.”31  Thus, EPA never established any clear 
guidelines for what constitutes “contiguous or adjacent” in the 
1980 PSD Preamble, but indicated that facilities separated by 
considerable distances should not be aggregated. 
Beginning in the early 1980s, EPA began to de-emphasize 
the plain meaning of “contiguous or adjacent” in its guidance 
documents and interpretation letters, and developed a functional 
interdependence test instead.  Specifically, using the overarching 
principle of a common sense notion of a plant as guidance, EPA 
Regional Offices evaluated the relationship between facilities to 
determine whether the distance between them was short enough 
to allow the facilities to operate as a single source.32  For 
example, EPA stated in an interpretation letter: 
EPA has noted that whether or not two facilities are adjacent 
depends on the “common sense” notion of a source and the 
functional inter-relationship of the facilities and is not simply a 
matter of the physical distance between the two facilities.  
However, the physical distance between two facilities is obviously 
 
 28. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 362 (9th ed. 2009). 
 29. Id. at 46. 
 30. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. at 52,695. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Letter from Richard R. Long, EPA Region 8, to Lynn Menlove, Utah 
Division of Air Quality, at 1-2 (May 21, 1998) (on file with author). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/1
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a factor to be considered in deciding whether the two are close 
enough to be considered one source in a given situation.33 
Moreover, in a guidance letter, EPA Region 8 listed several 
factors that EPA considers when determining whether facilities 
are contiguous or adjacent.  The contiguous or adjacent factors 
strikingly resemble the factors listed for a support facility 
analysis to determine whether facilities are part of the same 
industrial grouping: 
[1] Was the location of the new facility chosen primarily because 
of its proximity to the existing facility, to enable the operations to 
be integrated? . . . [2] Will materials be routinely transferred 
between the facilities?  Supporting evidence for this could include 
a physical link or transportation link . . . , such as a pipeline, 
railway, special-purpose or public road, channel or conduit. [3] 
Will managers or other workers frequently shuttle back and forth 
to be involved actively in both facilities? [4] Will the production 
process itself be split in any way between facilities, i.e., will one 
facility produce an intermediate product that requires further 
processing at the other facility, with associated air pollutant 
emissions?34 
These factors are prevalent throughout numerous other EPA 
guidance documents and source determinations, although not 
applied consistently.35  Accordingly, as the EPA guidance 
documents suggest, physical distance alone does not determine 
 
 33. Letter from EPA to John T. Higgins (Oct.11, 2000) (on file with author). 
 34. Letter from Richard R. Long, EPA Region 8, to Lynn Menlove, Utah Div. 
of Air Quality, supra note 32, at 2. 
 35. See Memorandum from Robert G. Kellam, EPA, to Richard R. Long (Aug. 
27, 1996) (“Whether facilities are contiguous or adjacent is determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the relationship between the facilities.”) (on file 
with author); See also Letter from Pamela Blakely, EPA, to Don Sutton, EPA 
(Mar. 14, 2006) (using the “common sense notion of a plant” as the guiding 
principle in determining that four facilities operated by one company but located 
up to eight miles apart were a single Title V source because “the activities 
occurring at these sites all assist in supporting” the main manufacturing 
operation of the company) (on file with author); Letter from Kathleen Henry, 
EPA, to John Slade, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Jan. 15, 1999) (“determining 
whether facilities are contiguous or adjacent depends not only on the physical 
distance between them but [also] on the type of nexus (relationship) between 
facilities.”) (on file with author). 
9
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whether facilities are contiguous or adjacent.  Rather, if facilities 
are close enough to be functionally interdependent, they will be 
considered a single source, so long as they are also under common 
control and in the same industrial grouping.  Thus, according to 
prior EPA guidance documents and interpretation letters, in 
determining whether facilities are contiguous or adjacent, 
physical distance and proximity are merely one factor within a 
much broader functional interdependence analysis. 
For non-oil and gas facilities, EPA Regional Offices have 
concluded that facilities were contiguous or adjacent under the 
following circumstances, among many others: a mine and a 
processing plant connected by a forty-four mile-long pipeline;36 a 
plant and a pump station 21.5 miles apart connected by a 
dedicated channel;37 a brewery and a land farm six miles apart 
connected by a pipeline.38  Although the facilities in these cases 
were separated by a number of miles, the operations were 
connected by a pipeline or dedicated conveyance.  In each of these 
cases, EPA believed that such a physical connection was a salient 
factor that demonstrated an integral relationship between the 
facilities, allowing EPA to conclude they were contiguous or 
adjacent. 
C. The Wehrum and McCarthy Memos 
1. The Wehrum Memo 
On January 12, 2007, William Wehrum, Acting Assistant 
Administrator for the EPA Office of Air and Radiation (OAR), 
issued a memorandum (the “Wehrum Memo”)39 to provide 
guidance to permitting authorities in making major source 
determinations for the oil and gas industry.  Recognizing the 
complexity of oil and gas production operations, the Wehrum 
 
 36. See Letter from Richard R. Long, EPA Region 8, to Dennis Myers, 
Colorado Dep’t of Public Health & Env’t (Apr. 20, 1999) (on file with author). 
 37. See Letter from Richard R. Long, EPA Region 8, to Lynn R. Menlove, 
Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (Aug. 8, 1997) (on file with author). 
 38. See Letter from Robert Kellam, EPA Office of Air Quality Planning 
Standards, to Richard R. Long, EPA Region 8 (Aug. 27, 1996) (on file with 
author). 
 39. Wehrum Memo, supra note 3. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/1
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Memo attempted to simplify source aggregation decisions for oil 
and gas operations by creating more certainty in how the 
“contiguous or adjacent” factor is applied. 
To simplify source determination, the Wehrum Memo 
recommended that permitting authorities begin an aggregation 
analysis by determining whether each individual surface site 
constitutes a separate source.40  The memorandum defined 
“surface site” generally as a single area of development, which 
“includes any combination of one or more graded pad sites, 
foundations, platforms, or the immediate physical location upon 
which equipment is physically affixed.”41  If the permitting 
authority has determined that the surface sites at issue are under 
common control and in the same industrial grouping, it should 
consider aggregating pollutant-emitting activities at multiple 
surface sites if they are in close proximity to one another.42  
Surface sites are in close proximity if they are physically adjacent 
or separated by no more than a short distance (e.g., across a 
highway, separated by a city block, or some similar distance).43  
Finally, once the stationary source is identified (the aggregated 
surface sites), the permitting authority should consider all the 
equipment located on the surface sites collectively to determine 
whether they qualify as a major stationary source for the 
purposes of NSR and Title V permitting.44 
The Wehrum Memo acknowledged that the three overarching 
principles set out by the court in Alabama Power, and expressed 
in the 1980 PSD Preamble, should guide permitting authorities 
when interpreting the regulatory criteria for source 
determination.  “Specifically, [the permitting authority] must: (1) 
reasonably carry out the purposes of. . . (PSD); (2) approximate a 
common sense notion of a ‘plant;’ and (3) avoid aggregating 
pollutant-emitting activities that as a group would not fit within 
the ordinary meaning of ‘building,’ ‘structure,’ ‘facility,’ or 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2. 
11
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‘installation.’”45  The Wehrum Memo expressed that the “common 
sense” notion of a plant should be the foremost guiding 
principle.46 
Guided by the above-mentioned overarching principles, the 
Wehrum Memo rejected the use of functional interdependence to 
determine whether facilities are “contiguous or adjacent.”  The 
memo noted that in the 1980 PSD Preamble, EPA explicitly 
declined to add a “functionality” criteria to the definition of source 
because EPA believed that “assessments of functional 
interrelationships would be “highly subjective” and “embroil . . . 
the Agency in fine-grained analysis” that would potentially lead 
to results that do not conform to the common sense notion of a 
plant.47  Aggregating oil and gas field activities that occur over 
large geographic distances defied the concept of contiguous or 
adjacent.48  Given the complex nature of oil and gas activities, the 
Wehrum Memo concluded that physical proximity is the most 
informative factor in a contiguous or adjacent analysis.49 
Further justifying its de-emphasis of functional 
interdependence, the Wehrum Memo noted that Congress 
recognized the unique geographic attributes of the oil and gas 
industry when it provided direction on how oil and gas 
exploration and production operations should be aggregated 
under the CAA section 112 hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) 
program.50  Specifically, section 112(n)(4) of the CAA provides: 
emissions from any pipeline compressor or pump station shall not 
be aggregated with emissions from other similar units, whether 
or not such units are in a contiguous area or under common 
control, to determine whether such units or stations are major 
sources, and in the case of any oil or gas exploration or 
 
 45. Wehrum Memo, supra note 3 (citing Requirements for Preparation, 
Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation 
of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,694-95 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 124)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 2-3. 
 48. Id. at 4. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/1
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production well (with its associated equipment), such emissions 
shall not be aggregated for any purpose under this section.51 
Under this congressional mandate, EPA defined major source 
under section 112, regarding the oil and gas industry, in 
reference to individual surface sites.52  The Wehrum Memo 
recognized that permitting authorities should not strictly apply 
the section 112 major source definition to NSR and Title V 
permitting, but that EPA “does believe that the ‘surface site’ is a 
reasonable place to begin the source determination analysis.”53 
The Wehrum Memo concluded that: 
[In] a great majority of cases, we expect that permitting 
authorities will find a single surface is the most suitable 
industrial grouping because it correlates best with the definition 
of a stationary source.  Accordingly, permitting authorities could 
treat each surface site as a separate stationary source and 
generally would not need to aggregate activities located on 
different oil and gas properties (oil and gas lease, mineral fee 
tract, subsurface unit area, surface fee tract, or surface lease 
tract) or located on the same lease, when the sites are not located 
in close proximity to each other.54 
2. The McCarthy Memo 
On September 22, 2009, Gina McCarthy, Assistant 
Administrator for the OAR, issued a memorandum (the 
“McCarthy Memo”), withdrawing the Wehrum Memo.55  Rather 
than continue the simplified source determination process 
expounded by the Wehrum Memo, the McCarthy Memo reverted 
EPA policy to the in-depth case-by-case analysis that was in place 
before the Wehrum Memo.  Essentially, the reasoning for the 
 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(4)(A) (2012). 
 52. Wehrum Memo, supra note 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Memorandum from Gina McCarthy, OAR, to EPA Regional 
Administrators, Regions I-X, Withdrawal of Source Determinations for Oil and 
Gas Industries (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/region07/ 
air/nsr/nsrmemos/oilgaswithdrawal.pdf [hereinafter McCarthy Memo]. 
13
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policy shift was that the Wehrum Memo process simplified source 
determinations too much: 
The [Wehrum Memo] attempted to simplify this analysis by 
focusing on one of the three regulatory criteria for source 
determinations – whether activities are “adjacent or contiguous.” 
It emphasized proximity in addressing this criterion.  In practice, 
however, I find individual facts warrant a closer examination of 
all three criteria identified in those regulations to arrive at a 
reasoned decision, and therefore, the simplified approach 
provided in the [Wehrum Memo] should not be relied on by 
permitting authorities as a sufficient endpoint in the decision-
making process.56 
The McCarthy Memo went on to state that permitting authorities 
should rely foremost on all three regulatory criteria for source 
determinations: (1) common control, (2) contiguous or adjacent, 
and (3) same industrial grouping; and that permitting authorities 
should apply these criteria with respect to the explanation 
provided in the 1980 PSD Preamble.57  Moreover, the McCarthy 
Memo concluded that source determinations for oil and gas 
facilities “will continue to be complex” and may involve “in-depth 
analyses of ownership and operational issues.”58  Thus, instead of 
beginning the source determination analysis at the surface site, 
as in the Wehrum Memo, the McCarthy Memo prescribed the 
equivocal fine-grained case-by-case analysis used by EPA for 
source determinations prior to the Wehrum Memo. 
Unfortunately, the McCarthy Memo incorrectly interpreted 
the Wehrum Memo.  The McCarthy Memo interpreted the 
Wehrum Memo as focusing on the contiguous or adjacent criteria 
at the expense of the other two factors.  This is not the case.  Only 
after assuming that the first two criteria are met did the Wehrum 
Memo proceed to analyze the contiguous or adjacent factor.  
Although determining whether two or more facilities share 
common control and the same industrial grouping can sometimes 
entail a complicated analysis, the process of evaluating these 
factors is not nearly as contentious an issue as whether oil and 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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gas facilities are contiguous or adjacent.  As stated in the 
Wehrum Memo, “[e]ven when two or more pollutant-emitting 
activities are clearly under common control and belong to the 
same [industrial grouping], the unique geographical attributes of 
the oil and gas industry necessitate a detailed evaluation of 
whether the activities are contiguous or adjacent.”59  The 
contiguous or adjacent factor is not more important than the 
other two, as the McCarthy Memo interpreted the Wehrum Memo 
as stating.  The Wehrum Memo recognized that all three factors 
must be met to aggregate sources, and merely attempted to 
provide some clarity to an ambiguous term as it is applied to a 
diverse and complex industry.  Nevertheless, the McCarthy 
Memo represents EPA’s current interpretation of the three-factor 
definition of source. 
D. Recent EPA Case-by-Case Determinations 
1. MacClarence v. EPA 
MacClarence v. EPA involved the aggregation of BP’s crude 
oil production well pads and processing facilities in the Prudhoe 
Bay Unit (PBU) on Alaska’s North Slope.60  Initially, a BP 
affiliate in the PBU filed a draft Title V operating permit with the 
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), but 
the permit did not aggregate the production facility at issue, 
Gathering Center  #1 (GC1), with any other stationary sources in 
the PBU.61  At the time, crude oil was produced from thirty-eight 
individual drill sites and pumped to one of six dedicated 
production centers within the PBU where it was processed and 
distributed to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline for sale.62  After the 
draft permit was submitted to ADEC, a private citizen submitted 
comments arguing that all of BP’s stationary sources in the PBU 
should be aggregated.63  In spite of the citizen’s comments, ADEC 
 
 59. Wehrum Memo, supra note 3. 
 60. See MacClarence v. EPA, 596 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 61. Id. at 1127-28. 
 62. BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc. Gathering Center #1, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,813 
(EPA, Apr. 20, 2007) (order denying petition for objection to permit). 
 63. MacClarence, 596 F.3d at 1128. 
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issued a proposed permit that did not aggregate GC1 with any 
other sources.64  However, after the proposed permit was issued, 
EPA raised concerns about the lack of a discussion regarding the 
private citizen’s aggregation comments.65  Consequently, EPA, 
ADEC, and BP collaborated to resolve the aggregation issue.66  
After these discussions concluded, ADEC reissued a draft permit, 
employing a “hub-and-spoke” aggregation model that collocated 
GC1 with the seven well pads that supplied it with crude oil.67  
However, the permit did not aggregate GC1 with the rest of the 
PBU facilities, as requested by the citizen, and he filed a petition 
with the EPA requesting that the Administrator object to the 
permit.68  The Administrator denied the petition, stating that the 
citizen failed to provide adequate information or legal support in 
his petition.69 
The Administrator cited an ADEC Statement of Basis 
regarding the draft permit in the reasoning for her decision, 
which the Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal.70  In the Statement 
of Basis, ADEC explained that it rejected aggregation of all PBU 
facilities because, among other reasons: 
(1) the PBU covers roughly 300 square miles and therefore 
aggregation “stretches the concept of proximity” that underlies 
aggregation determinations; (2) “[t]he complexity of 
administering . . . and operating . . . a stationary source as large 
as the PBU without clear corresponding environmental benefit 
argues against” aggregation of the entire PBU; and (3) “there 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1129. 
 69. MacClarence, 596 F.3d at 1129. 
 70. BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc. Gathering Center #1, 50 Fed. Reg. at 
26,814 (“ADEC discussed in great detail why it decided, based on the applicable 
statutes, regulation, and EPA guidance and specific facts before ADEC, that it 
was not appropriate to aggregate all facilities within the entire PBU.”). 
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[was] no precedent for defining such a large stationary source . . . 
.”71 
Additionally, pipeline connections were not a deciding factor in an 
aggregation analysis because “pipelines connect everything” in 
the oil and gas industry.72  ADEC explained that source 
determination based on pipeline connectivity, without regard to 
the concept of a common sense notion of a plant, “would result in 
one stationary source extending from the North Slope oil fields all 
the way to the Valdez Marine Terminal.”73 
Physical proximity was not a determinative factor in ADEC’s 
final contiguous or adjacent analysis.  The longest distance 
between a well pad and a production facility that were aggregated 
in the PBU was nine miles.  Rather than consider distance, 
ADEC applied a case-by-case analysis with the common sense 
notion of a plant being the guiding principle – the functional 
interdependence test.74 
To determine if the facilities that were aggregated with GC1 
were contiguous or adjacent, ADEC developed a “wagon wheel” 
model based on the production centers (hubs) and well pads 
(spokes).75  Consistent with the McCarthy Memo, ADEC reasoned 
that this model was appropriate because it fit the concept of a 
common sense notion of a plant.  The well pads delivered crude 
oil (raw materials) to the production center for processing into 
sales oil (finished product) for delivery and custody transfer at a 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline pump station.76  Thus, each production 
center and its associated well pads constituted a single stationary 
source because of their functional interdependence. 
 
 71. MacClarence, 596 F.3d at 1128-29, (citing Alaska Dep’t of Env’t 
Conservation Air Quality Operating/Construction Permit, Permit No. 182TVP01 
5 (Feb. 17, 2004). 
 72. Alaska Dep’t of Env’t Conservation Air Quality Operating/Construction 
Permit (draft), Permit No. 182TVP01 6 (Feb. 17, 2004). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 4. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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2. Summit Petroleum v. EPA 
Summit Petroleum Corporation operates a natural gas 
sweetening plant in Michigan that is connected to approximately 
100 sour natural gas wells via pipeline.  These wells supply gas 
exclusively to the sweetening plant.  The closest gas well is 500 
feet from the sweetening plant and the furthest gas well is over 
eight miles away.  Overall, the wells are located across three 
separate field units that are not contiguous, covering a forty-three 
square-mile area.77 
In January 2005, Summit submitted a written request to 
EPA Region 5 requesting a determination of major source status 
for the above-described facilities.78  On April 26, 2007, EPA 
Region 5 responded to Summit’s request.79  Although Region 5 
indicated that it believed Summit’s facilities fit the common sense 
notion of a plant because the wells supplied gas to the plant, 
Region 5 acknowledged that, under the Wehrum Memo, 
proximity was the most determinative factor in a contiguous or 
adjacent analysis.80  Region 5 stated it was unable to make a 
decision and requested more information from Summit to 
evaluate the proximity of the wells and the plant.81  After a series 
of correspondence between Summit and Region 5, the Regional 
Office issued a final decision on Summit’s source determination 
request on September 8, 2009, two weeks prior to the release of 
the McCarthy Memo.82  After four years of working to make a 
determination, Region 5 concluded that the wells and plant were 
adjacent and constituted a single source for the purpose of 
Summit’s Title V permit.  In current litigation, Summit alleges 
that Region 5 did not provide a basis for its decision other than to 
cite previous correspondence between Region 5 and Summit, 
which relied on the Wehrum Memo.83 
 
 77. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 27, Summit Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 
Nos. 09-4348, 10-4572 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2011). 
 78. Id. at 6. 
 79. Id. at 7. 
 80. Id. at17. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 10. 
 83. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 10-11, Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 
Nos. 09-4348, 10-4572. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/1
  
2012] AGGREGATION CONSTERNATION 663 
 
Summit filed a petition in the Sixth Circuit appealing EPA 
Region 5’s decision.  However, the case was held in abeyance to 
allow Region 5 to reconsider its determination and obtain 
additional information from Summit.84  Summit continued to 
argue to Region 5 that because the gas wells were separated from 
the sweetening plant by a considerable distance and intervening 
properties, they were not contiguous or adjacent and did not fit 
the common sense notion of a plant.85  On October 18, 2010, EPA 
Region 5 issued a letter to Summit summarizing its review and 
reissued a final determination.86  However, physical proximity 
was not relevant to Region 5’s decision.87  Citing the McCarthy 
Memo as guidance this time, Region 5 applied the functional 
interdependence test: “the sour gas wells are truly 
interdependent on the sweetening plant – the wells provide all 
their sour gas to the sweetening plant, the sour gas cannot flow 
anywhere else, and Summit owns and operates the sweetening 
plant and well sites.”88  Consequently, Summit has resumed its 
appeal, which is currently pending in the Sixth Circuit. 
3. In re Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 
Frederick Compressor Station 
On January 1, 2007, the Colorado Department of Public 
Health and Environment (CDPHE) renewed the Title V operating 
permit for the Frederick Compressor Station, which collects 
natural gas and liquid condensate products from wells in the 
Wattenberg field.  Numerous oil and gas companies own and 
operate approximately 24,000 wells scattered over 2,000 square 
miles in the field.89  Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (Anadarko) 
 
 84. Id. at 12. 
 85. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 37-44, Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 
Nos. 09-4348, 10-4572. 
 86. Letter from Cheryl L. Norton, Director, Air & Radiation Div., EPA Region 
5, to Scott Huber, Summit Petroleum Corporation Corp. (Oct. 18, 2010), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/region07/air/title5/t5memos/singler5.pdf (on file 
with author) [(hereinafter Letter from Cheryl L. Norton to Scott Huber]). 
 87. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 7, Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, Nos. 
09-4348, 10-4572. 
 88. Letter from Cheryl L. Norton to Scott Huber, supra note 86, at 3. 
 89. Order Granting Petition for Objection to Anadarko Petroleum Corp.’s 
Frederick Compressor Station Title V Permit, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,610 (Oct. 10, 
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operates over 4,000 wells in the Wattenberg field, and the 
Frederick Compressor Station is one of seven natural gas 
compressor stations that Anadarko owns and operates in the 
field.90  The facility consists of three large natural-gas-fired 
reciprocating internal combustion engines that emit NOx and 
VOCs in “major” amounts.91 
On January 3, 2007, an environmental advocacy group92 filed 
a petition with the EPA Administrator requesting that the 
Agency object to CDPHE’s issuance of the renewal Title V permit 
for the Frederick Compressor Station.93  On February 7, 2008, 
the Administrator granted the petition on the grounds that 
CDPHE failed to adequately respond to the petitioner’s comments 
regarding the source aggregation issues and ordered CPDHE to 
respond to petitioner’s comments.94  On April 29, 2008, CDPHE 
supplemented the Title V permit application, but concluded no 
changes to the [Title V] permit were warranted.95  Relying 
extensively on the Wehrum Memo, which was in effect at the 
time, CPDHE focused its “adjacent” analysis on proximity and 
ownership of wells that were within one city block of the 
compressor station.96  However, the petitioners were not satisfied 
with the response and, on October 14, 2008, filed a second 
 
2009), available at http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/ap/Frederick/A-
1EPAOrderAnadarko FrederickStation10.08.09.pdf. 
 90. Order Denying Petition for Objection to Anadarko Petroleum Corp.’s 
Frederick Compressor Station Title V Permit, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,361 (Feb. 16, 
2011).  At the time of its Title V permit renewal on January 1, 2007, the 
Frederick Compressor Station was owned by Kerr-McGee Gathering, LLC, 
which is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Anadarko. 
 91. Id. at 10,362. 
 92. Rocky Mountain Clean Air merged with WildEarth Guardians on 
September 16, 2008.  See Merger Gives Might to WildEarth Guardians’ Climate 
and Energy Program, WILDEARTH GUARDIANS, http://www.wildearthguardians. 
org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5516 (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 93. See Petition for Objection to Issuance of Operating Permit for Anadarko 
Petroleum Corporation’s Frederick Compressor Station (EPA Jan. 3, 2007). 
 94. See Order Responding to Petitioners’ Request that Admin. Object to 
Issuance of State Operating Permit, VIII-2007-[sic] (EPA Feb. 7, 2008) 
(Administrator review). 
 95. See Addendum to the January 1, 2007 Technical Review Document for 
Renewable Operating Permit 950PWE035 (EPA April 29, 2008) (Administrator 
response). 
 96. Id. 
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petition requesting that the EPA Administrator object to the 
operating permit.97 
On October 9, 2009, two weeks after the McCarthy Memo 
withdrew the Wehrum Memo, the EPA Administrator granted 
the environmental group’s petition.98  Curiously, the 
Administrator admonished CDPHE for using “one city block” to 
measure proximity, even though it was one of the examples the 
Wehrum Memo provided: 
In relying primarily on proximity and only evaluating ownership 
within one city block without any explanation as to why that 
distance was appropriate under the circumstances and without 
an examination of other criteria relevant to source 
determination, CDPHE failed to adequately support or explain 
its aggregation decision.99 
Nevertheless, the Administrator ordered CDPHE to “do a 
thorough analysis” of the aggregation issue by applying all three 
regulatory criteria for identifying emissions sources that belong 
to the same building, structure, facility, or installation, as 
emphasized in the McCarthy Memo.100 
On July 14, 2010, CDPHE issued a detailed forty-two page 
response, and again decided not to aggregate the Frederick 
Compressor Station with other wells in the Wattenberg Field.101  
In defiance of the McCarthy Memo and EPA’s reliance on 
functional interdependence, CDPHE noted that “the concept of 
“interdependency” . . . is not discussed in the 1980 PSD Preamble, 
or mentioned in the federal PSD or Title V regulations defining 
‘source.’”102  Rather, CDPHE pointed out that it was a concept 
developed over time through EPA guidance documents and case-
by-case determinations.103  CDPHE concluded, “while the 
 
 97. See Petition for Objection to Issuance of Operating Permit for Anadarko 
Petroleum Corp.’s Frederick Compressor Station (EPA Oct. 14, 2008). 
 98. See Order Granting Petition for Objection to Permit (EPA Oct. 9, 2009). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Response of CDPHE, Air Pollution Control Division, To Order 
Granting Petition for Objection to Permit, VIII-2008-02 (EPA Jul. 14, 2010) 
(Administrator response) [hereinafter Response of CDPHE]. 
 102. Id. at 14. 
 103. Id. 
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[CDPHE] has thoughtfully considered ‘interdependency’ as part 
of its contiguous or adjacent analysis, given the unique 
engineering and commercial complexities in the oil and gas 
production midstream sector, the [CDPHE] will not necessarily 
look to interdependency as a determining factor in this or other 
similar cases.”104 
CDPHE then went on to discuss proximity factors in the 
Wattenberg field that led to its conclusion not to aggregate.105  
However, in an apparent attempt to satisfy EPA, CDPHE 
discussed a detailed set of facts that would apply to a functional 
interdependence analysis.  For instance, the Frederick 
Compressor Station has no operational control over the wells and 
associated pollutant-emitting activities that it services.106  There 
are numerous compressor stations in the Wattenberg Field and 
gas gathering agreements do not specify which gas will move 
through the Frederick Compressor Station.107  Information 
gathered by CDPHE indicates that in a mature field, such as 
Wattenberg, the production and gathering system results in a 
spider web of gathering and distribution lines, compressor 
stations, and wells, which overlap, run parallel, and cross at 
different depths.108  Moreover, once gas flows into the gathering 
system, it becomes co-mingled and is indistinguishable from gas 
from wells not owned or operated by Anadarko.109  Furthermore, 
if the Frederick Compressor shuts down, gas would flow through 
other compressor stations.110  Thus, CDPHE reached the 
conclusion that gas wells and associated equipment owned or 
operated by Anadarko are not solely dependent on the Frederick 
Compressor Station, and vice-versa. 
Nevertheless, the environmental group challenged CDPHE’s 
response.111  But on February 2, 2011, the EPA Administrator 
 
 104. Id. at 15. 
 105. See id. at 16. 
 106. See Response of CDPHE, supra note 101, at 25. 
 107. See id. at 24-25. 
 108. Id. at 25. 
 109. Id. at 26. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See WildEarth Guardians Petition for Objection (EPA Nov. 3, 2010). 
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finally sided with CDPHE’s exhaustive response memo.112  The 
Administrator conducted a thorough analysis of prior EPA 
guidance documents and determinations regarding aggregation 
and concluded that CDPHE had properly determined that the 
Frederick Compressor Station, alone, was a single source for PSD 
and Title V purposes. 
Thus, even though CDPHE rejected the use of functional 
interdependence, its analysis included enough facts for the EPA 
Administrator to conclude that the Frederick Compressor Station 
and wells in the Wattenberg Field were not interdependent, and 
therefore not contiguous or adjacent.113 
IV. STATE REGULATIONS 
Several states have developed guidance on aggregation of oil 
and gas exploration, production, and distribution activities.  
These guidance documents focus on the contiguous or adjacent 
prong of the three-part aggregation analysis, which, as previously 
discussed, has proven to be the most contentious issue in the 
aggregation analysis for the oil and gas industry.  Each of the 
following state guidance documents advocates a general quarter 
mile rule of thumb to consider facilities adjacent, and discuss 
proximity in great detail.  Although each of the states 
acknowledge that functional interdependence plays some kind of 
role in a source determination, the state guidance documents do 
not describe how functional interdependence is to be applied in 
great detail.  The guidance documents are written as if to merely 
give a nod to the McCarthy Memo.  Thus, it appears that the 
following states only reticently acknowledge functional 
interdependence because their regulations must be at least as 
stringent as the federal requirements. 
A. Wyoming 
On February 23, 2010, the Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality (WDEQ) made a presentation to EPA 
 
 112. See EPA Order Denying Petition for Objection to Permit (EPA Feb. 2, 
2011) (admin. review). 
 113. Id. 
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regarding its position on aggregation of oil and gas activities.114  
WDEQ began by stating, “[w]e use EPA’s definition of ‘source,’” 
and outlined the four-part statutory definition (i.e., building, 
structure, facility, or installation) and the three-prong regulatory 
definition (i.e., common control, same industrial grouping, and 
contiguous or adjacent).115  WDEQ noted that a pipeline, on its 
own, does not constitute contiguous or adjacent.116  However, 
“nothing escapes permitting consideration.”117 
WDEQ then proffered a criticism of EPA’s reliance on policy 
memos, contending that functional interdependence is not an 
expressed element of the three-part aggregation test, and was 
only developed through a series of EPA guidance documents.118  
WDEQ warned that aggregating oil and gas sources would result 
in additional permitting timelines and burdens with little or no 
environmental benefit.119  The potential permitting workload 
would increase for every new well drilled, and there would be an 
increase in litigation.120  WDEQ also argued that its source 
determinations were consistent with the CAA and EPA 
regulations, but that EPA efforts “could erode [the] predictability 
we currently have.”121 
WDEQ concluded the presentation with recommendations on 
how to define “source.”  According to WDEQ, a permitting 
authority should “[a]dhere to the statutory and regulatory 
definitions of ‘stationary source,’ as informed by EPA’s PSD rule 
preamble discussion, and the guidance provided by Alabama 
Power.”122  However, it should not “rely upon past EPA regional 
office decisions which substituted a ‘functional relationship’ or 
‘proximity’ test for the statutory definition.”123 
 
 114. See Aggregation in Wyoming, WYO. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY (Feb. 23, 
2010), available at http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/ap/Frederick/A-
7WyomingPowerPointPresentation2_23_2010.pdf. 
 115. Id. at 2. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 4. 
 119. Id. at 6. 
 120. See Aggregation in Wyoming, supra note 114, at 6. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. 
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B. Oklahoma 
Oklahoma state regulations essentially adopt the EPA three-
part definition of source, i.e., common control, contiguous or 
adjacent, and same industrial grouping.124  Similar to EPA 
guidance, the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality 
(ODEQ), Air Quality Division, employs a case-by-case analysis to 
determine whether to aggregate sources.  However, ODEQ 
prescribes a hybrid approach to source determination that 
includes distance and interdependence factors.125  In a guidance 
document, ODEQ considers facilities located within a quarter 
mile of one another to be “within a contiguous area.”126  However, 
the Agency notes that distance “may not adequately deal with 
situations with more extenuating circumstances; such as when 
sources are not within [a quarter] mile of each other, but 
operationally support each other and are ‘connected’ by some 
means of transportation (for example; pipeline, road, or 
railroad).”127  Accordingly, these facilities must be analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis.128  For example, ODEQ provides that if two 
facilities are located in different counties and the property 
boundaries are more than five miles apart, they will likely be 
considered “adjacent” if they operationally support each other and 
are physically joined in any manner.129  However, if the facilities 
do not operationally support each other and are not connected 
then they are not considered adjacent due to geographical 
distance and logistics.130 
C. Louisiana 
The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
(LDEQ) also provides guidance regarding the aggregation of oil 
 
 124. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252:100-7-1.1 (2011) (defining “facility”). 
 125. See OKLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, AIR PERMITTING COLLOCATED 
FACILITIES (2011), available at http://www.crossroads.odl.state.ok.us/cdm4/ 
document.php?CISOROOT=/stgovpub&CISOPTR=47512&REC=7. 
 126. Id. at 3. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. 
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and gas production facilities.  LDEQ states, “sites separated by [a 
quarter] mile or less shall be considered contiguous.”131  Permit 
applications should provide a map of all facilities under common 
control that are located within a quarter mile of the “target 
facility,” which establishes a boundary for contiguous facilities.132  
Facilities should not be “daisy-chained” together to establish a 
continuous grouping.133  Although LDEQ primarily relies on a 
proximity analysis, the Agency will also consider factors such as 
interdependency for facilities separated by more than a quarter 
mile, “given the particular circumstances for a given case.”134 
D. Texas 
Similar to Oklahoma and Louisiana, the Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) considers proximity and 
interdependence when determining whether to aggregate 
facilities for NSR and Title V purposes.  In a guidance document, 
TCEQ states, “properties located less than a [quarter] mile apart 
are considered contiguous.”135  However, TCEQ acknowledges the 
McCarthy Memo and provides, “[w]hile proximity of sources to 
one another should be considered when determining whether 
contiguous and adjacent, a case-by-case analysis of all criteria 
must be conducted.”136  As such, TCEQ also provides that 
interdependent properties located more than a quarter mile apart 
might also be contiguous.137  TCEQ defines interdependent 
properties as those that are mutually dependent, meaning one 
property supports or is supported by another and cannot function 
independently.138 
 
 131. LA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, INTERPRETATION OF CONTIGUOUS FOR OIL & 
GAS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 1 (2011), available at www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/ 
tabid/2347/Default.aspx. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, DEFINITION OF SITE GUIDANCE 
DOCUMENT 1 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/ 
permitting/air/Guidance/Title_V/site.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2011). 
 136. Id. at 2 
 137. Id. at 1. 
 138. Id. 
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However, beginning April 1, 2011, TCEQ plans to implement 
regulations to replace a type of minor source permit for oil and 
gas sites in the Barnett Shale area, and for oil and gas sites 
statewide in 2012.  Under the new minor source permit, all oil 
and gas facilities that are operationally dependent and located no 
more than a quarter mile apart must be aggregated in the same 
permit.139  If piping is the only connection between facilities and 
the distance between them exceeds a quarter mile, then the 
facilities are considered separate.140  To ensure there is no daisy-
chaining of facilities, the quarter mile boundary of the site 
becomes fixed when the permit is registered and no facility within 
the boundary may be authorized under more than one 
registration.141 
In comments to the proposed rule, EPA contended that the 
quarter mile limitation should not be included as part of the 
definition of oil and gas sites, and reminded TCEQ of the 
requirements stated in the McCarthy Memo.142  TCEQ responded 
in the following manner: 
Determinations for federal new source review and federal 
operating permits beyond the [quarter] mile and relying on other 
relevant factors must continue to occur on a case-by-case basis.  
If these federal review requirements apply, a PBR or standard 
permit will not be the appropriate mechanism for 
authorization.143 
Accordingly, owners and operators of oil and gas facilities must 
determine if federal requirements apply to their facilities, and if 
so, they will not be eligible for the minor source permit.  Thus, 
under TCEQ’s new minor source permit regime, owners and 
 
 139. Air Quality Standard Permit for Oil and Gas Handling and Production 
Facilities, TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, at (b)(6)(A)-(B), available at 
http://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/permitting/air/Announcements/oilgas-sp. 
pdf (last visited on Apr. 28, 2012). 
 140. Id. at (b)(6)(C). 
 141. Id. at (b)(6)(D). 
 142. Response to Comments, at 65, available at http://www.tceq.texas.gov/ 
permitting/air/newsourcereview/chemical/oil_and_gas_sp.html (Under the 
heading “Background Information on Recent Changes,” click on the hyperlink 
“Response to Comments”) (last visited Apr. 28, 2012). 
 143. Id at 66. 
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operators of oil and gas sites should conduct separate aggregation 
analyses for the Texas permit and federal NSR and Title V 
permits. 
V. FUNCTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE IS 
VULNERABLE TO A COURT CHALLENGE 
The United States Constitution provides rules guiding the 
creation of administrative agencies, such as the EPA, and the 
exercise of administrative power.  However, the Framers, to a 
considerable degree, left the extent of administrative powers open 
for debate in the political process they set in motion.144  
Additionally, the amended Constitution provides significant, but 
limited, protection for individual rights that administrative 
agencies may put at risk.145  In passing the Administrative 
Procedure Act [APA], Congress implemented a sub-constitution 
for administrative agencies that provides a flexible framework for 
federal agencies taking actions that affect individual rights.146 
Section 553 of the APA provides a uniform, baseline 
procedure for the most widespread form of agency action that 
creates rules with the force of law – informal or “notice and 
comment” rulemaking.  As stated by one commentator, “The 
heart of the informal rulemaking process of section 553 is a 
written exchange between the agency and interested members of 
the public.”147  To create a rule that has the force of law under 
section 553, an agency begins by publishing a “notice of proposed 
rulemaking” [NOPR] and invites written comments from the 
public.148  The notice is typically published in the Federal 
Register. 
The NOPR is significant for three reasons.  First, the NOPR 
subjects the findings and assumptions of administrative officials 
to “public scrutiny” that will foster “rational” and “informed” 
 
 144. KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 158 (2008). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id at 219. 
 148. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006). 
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rulemaking.149  Second, by providing interested members of the 
public an opportunity to shape regulations that will govern their 
conduct, the NOPR furthers the values of fairness and democratic 
participation.150  Third, the NOPR aids judicial review of a 
regulation by allowing the public to submit evidence supporting 
their positions for the administrative record.151  A NOPR is 
typically divided into two parts: a preamble, which discusses the 
legal, factual, and policy basis for the proposed rule; followed by 
the text of the proposed rule.152 
After reviewing the comments, an agency re-evaluates its 
proposed rule and makes changes as necessary to address 
concerns raised in the comments.153  The agency then publishes 
the final rule, along with a “statement of [its] basis and purpose,” 
and a regulation that has the force of law is created.154  
Reviewing courts expect the statement of basis and purpose to 
“indicate the major issues of policy that were raised in the 
proceedings and [to] explain why the agency decided to respond to 
these issues as it did, particularly in light of the statutory 
objectives that the rule must serve.”155  Accordingly, agencies 
must respond reasonably to those public comments that, if true, 
would have required the agency to change the rule.156 
Within the framework Congress established in Section 553 of 
the APA, EPA’s application of functional interdependence to 
source determinations and the McCarthy Memo’s prescription of 
its use raises serious concerns.  Rather than being tested under 
section 553’s notice and comment procedures, functional 
interdependence was developed over time through EPA guidance 
 
 149. WERHAN, supra note 144, at 228 (citing Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 
F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); see also Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 
F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 150. WERHAN, supra note 144, at 228-29; see, e.g., Small Refiner Lead Phase-
Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 151. WERHAN, supra note 144, at 228-29; see also Small Refiners, 705 F.2d at 
547; Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1271 n. 54 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 152. WERHAN, supra note 144, at 228-29. 
 153. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), (d) (2012). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987). 
 156. Reytblatt v. NRC, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Am. Mining Cong. 
v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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documents and case-by-case determinations.  Yet, the regulatory 
history of EPA’s definition of “source” rejects the concept of 
functional interdependence as applied to the contiguous or 
adjacent factor.  Thus, EPA has unreasonably interpreted the 
term “adjacent” to mean “interdependent,” and the Agency’s 
interpretation requires formal rulemaking including public notice 
and comment.  Moreover, if the validity of the McCarthy Memo is 
challenged in court, a reviewing court could set it aside. 
A. EPA Unreasonably Interprets “Contiguous or 
Adjacent” to mean “Interdependent” 
The McCarthy Memo and numerous other EPA guidance 
documents interpret “contiguous or adjacent” to mean 
“interdependent.”  As in the previously discussed EPA source 
determinations, interdependence is the primary factor EPA uses 
in its contiguous or adjacent analysis.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that an agency’s interpretation of its regulation is 
entitled to deference.157  Some courts of appeal describe this 
deference as being even greater than that granted to an agency 
interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to administer.158  
However, the D.C. Circuit expounds an outer limit to agency 
deference: 
A substantive regulation must have sufficient content and 
definitiveness as to the meaningful exercise in agency 
lawmaking.  It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate 
mush and then give it concrete form only through subsequent 
less formal “interpretations.”  That technique would circumvent 
section 553, the notice and comment procedures of the APA.159 
Accordingly, a reviewing court will not defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulations unless: (1) the regulation is 
 
 157. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (ruling that an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulations has “controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”). 
 158. See, e.g., Capital Network Sys. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 201, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
Paradissiotics v. Rubin, 171 F.3d 983, 987 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 159. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
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ambiguous;160 and (2) the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable.161  If a regulation is unambiguous, then a reviewing 
court will not defer to an agency interpretation that contradicts 
the regulation’s plain language.162 
First, the term “contiguous or adjacent” unambiguously 
refers to physical distance and proximity, not “interdependence.”  
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a term is ambiguous if it 
is “susceptible to more precise definition and open to varying 
constructions.”163  As previously mentioned, Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “contiguous” as “Touching at a point or along a 
boundary; adjoining;” and “adjacent” as “Lying near or close to, 
but not necessarily touching.”164 Thus, the plain meaning of 
“contiguous or adjacent” emphasizes proximity and physical 
distance.  Application of the plain meaning of “contiguous or 
adjacent” to the regulation is bolstered by the decision in 
Alabama Power, where the D.C. Circuit commanded EPA to 
create a regulatory definition of source, “according to 
considerations such as proximity and ownership.”  It warned that 
EPA must avoid aggregating pollutant-emitting activities that as 
a group would not fit within the ordinary meaning of “building,” 
“structure,” “facility,” or “installation.”165  Therefore, the word 
“contiguous” unequivocally refers to a fixed physical distance, i.e., 
touching or adjoining.  Although the word “adjacent” does not 
describe a specific distance, it unambiguously refers to some kind 
of physical distance.  Because the EPA regulations do not define 
“adjacent,” the physical distance necessary to determine whether 
two or more facilities are adjacent remains unclear.  Thus, a court 
might consider the term “contiguous or adjacent” ambiguous in 
 
 160. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); Martin v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151-53 (1991). 
 161. See, e.g., Martin, 499 U.S. at 158 (“The reviewing court should defer to 
the Secretary only if the Secretary’s [rule] interpretation is reasonable.”); Ehlert 
v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (reviewing courts are “obligated to 
regard as controlling a reasonable, consistently applied administration” of an 
ambiguous agency rule). 
 162. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588 (“But Auer deference is only warranted 
when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.  The regulation in the case, 
however, is not ambiguous – it is plainly permissive.”). 
 163. Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006). 
 164. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 362 (9th ed. 2010). 
 165. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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the regulatory context because it does not specify a precise 
distance, leaving the term open to various constructions.  If the 
term adjacent is ambiguous, a reviewing court will defer to the 
EPA’s interpretation if it is reasonable.166 
However, EPA unreasonably interprets “contiguous or 
adjacent” to mean “interdependent.”  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has ruled that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
regulation is “subject to the same standard of substantive review 
as any other exercise of delegated lawmaking power.167  
Accordingly, to determine if an agency’s interpretation of its 
regulation is reasonable, a reviewing court will analyze the 
“ordinary” and “dictionary” meanings of the regulation, the 
“statutory context” of the provision, and the “broad purpose” and 
“legislative history” of the statute.168  As explained by the D.C. 
Circuit, “contemporary indications as to what the agency meant 
by the language used, such as the comments received, could play 
the same role as legislative history does in both steps of a 
Chevron analysis.”169  A court will also evaluate whether the 
regulation provides adequate notice that it could be interpreted in 
the manner that the agency interprets it.170 
As discussed above, the plain meaning of contiguous or 
adjacent unambiguously connotes proximity and physical 
distance.  However, the court in Alabama Power ruled that “EPA 
 
 166. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588; Martin, 499 U.S. at 158; Ehlert, 402 
U.S. at 105. 
 167. Martin, 499 U.S. at 158. 
 168. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 
687, 696-708 (1995) (to evaluate the reasonableness of an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute Congress has entrusted it to administer, reviewing 
courts “ask whether the [agency’s] interpretation . . . is reasonable in light of the 
language, legislative history, and policies of the statute.”). 
 169. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena., 117 F.3d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (citing King Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 860 F.2d 465, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); 
City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840-45 (1984) (The two-
step Chevron analysis defines the scope of judicial review of an agency’s 
construction of the statute which it administers.  First, a court must determine 
whether “Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue.”  If so, “that is 
the end of the matter.”  But if the statute is silent or ambiguous regarding the 
specific issue, a court must determine if the agency’s interpretation “is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
 170. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 585. 
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has discretion to define statutory terms reasonably so as to carry 
out the expressed purpose of the [CAA],” and that EPA could 
reasonably interpret the statutory terms “facility” and 
“installation” broad enough to cover an entire plant.171  To this 
end, EPA promulgated the three-part definition of “stationary 
source” (i.e., common control, contiguous or adjacent, and same 
industrial grouping) so that the definition of “source” would fit 
within the concept of a “common sense notion of a plant.”172  But 
in doing so, EPA expressly rejected the use of functional 
interdependence in the 1980 PSD Preamble: 
[Commentators] urged that EPA formulate a definition that 
looked only to proximity and function.  But such a definition . . . 
would unnecessarily increase uncertainty . . . and drain the 
Agency’s resources.  In addition, such a definition would present 
groupings . . . that would severely strain the boundaries of even 
the most elastic of the four terms, “building,” “structure,” 
“facility,” and “installation.”173 
EPA excluded the functionality requirement in favor of proximity 
because the Agency did not want to get bogged down in “highly 
subjective” assessments that would “embroil[] the Agency in 
numerous, fine-grained analyses.”174  Moreover, EPA explicitly 
referred to the term “contiguous or adjacent” in the context of 
proximity and physical distance: 
[S]ome urged EPA to add to the definition the provision that the 
properties for [long-line] operations are neither contiguous nor 
adjacent.  To add such a provision is unnecessary.  EPA has 
stated in the past and now confirms that it does not intend 
“source” to encompass activities that would be many miles apart 
along a long-line operation.175 
 
 171. Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 396. 
 172. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,694-95 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 
& 124). 
 173. Id. at 52,695. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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Moreover, “one commentator asked . . . whether EPA would 
[consider] a surface coal mine and an electrical generator 
separated by twenty miles, [but] linked by a railroad, [as a single] 
‘source’.”176  EPA responded that “it would not” because, “the 
mine and the generator would be too far apart.”177  EPA’s 
response does not mention the functional relationship between 
the facilities.  It blankly states that the facilities are too far apart.  
Therefore, as discussed in the 1980 PSD Preamble, EPA 
unmistakably intended the contiguous or adjacent factor to refer 
only to the physical distance or proximity between facilities, not 
their functional relationship. 
The problem with the 1980 PSD Preamble is that it does not 
provide clear guidance regarding the degree of proximity 
necessary to determine whether facilities are contiguous or 
adjacent.  The 1980 PSD Preamble states, “EPA is unable to say 
precisely at this point how far apart activities must be in order to 
be treated separately.  The Agency can answer that question only 
through case-by-case determinations.”178  Referring to prior EPA 
guidance documents and source determinations that applied 
functional interdependence to aggregate sources, the McCarthy 
Memo notes, “these numerous case-by-case determinations 
illustrate the kind of reasoned decision-making that is necessary 
to justify adequately a permitting authority’s source 
determination decision.”179  However, as previously discussed, 
these “highly fact-specific” case-by-case determinations have 
resulted precisely in the kind of “highly subjective” assessments 
that EPA expressly intended to avoid in the 1980 PSD 
Preamble.180 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,695 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, & 
124). 
 179. McCarthy Memo, supra note 55, at 2. 
 180. Id. at 2; cf. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans: Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,695 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, & 
124). 
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By prescribing “highly fact-specific case-by-case 
determinations,” the McCarthy Memo and other EPA guidance 
that rely on functional interdependence appear to confuse the 
contiguous or adjacent factor with a support facility analysis.  In 
the 1980 PSD Preamble, the concept of functional 
interdependence is implied from EPA’s discussion of support 
facilities.  As previously discussed, facilities must be part of the 
“same industrial grouping,” in addition to satisfying the other two 
regulatory criteria, to be aggregated.  EPA considers facilities to 
be in the same industrial grouping if they share the same SIC 
code.  However, EPA explicitly rejected classifying industrial 
grouping based solely on “functional interrelationships” because, 
“to have merely added function to the proposed definition as 
another abstract factor would have reduced the predictability of 
aggregating activities under that definition dramatically, since 
any assessment of functional interrelationships would be highly 
subjective.”181  Accordingly, to promote predictability and 
consistency, EPA utilizes SIC codes to objectively determine if 
facilities are part of the same industrial grouping. 
EPA only alludes to an analysis of the relationship between 
facilities when it must determine if the facilities are part of the 
same industrial grouping but have different SIC codes.  The 1980 
PSD Preamble states, “[w]here a single unit is used to support 
two otherwise distinct sets of activities, the unit is to be included 
within the source which relies most heavily on its support.”182  
This necessarily entails an analysis of the relationship between 
the support facility and the primary pollutant-emitting activity.  
However, a support facility analysis is only relevant when 
determining whether facilities are part of the same industrial 
grouping and do not share the same SIC code.  The support 
facility must also meet the two other regulatory criteria, i.e., 
(contiguous or adjacent and common control) to be aggregated 
with the primary facility.  In fact, the EPA Administrator 
acknowledges this in her Order Denying Petition for Objection to 
 
 181. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans: Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. at 52,695. 
 182. Id. 
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Permit the Frederick Compressor Station operating permit.183  
Nowhere in the 1980 PSD Preamble did EPA prescribe the use of 
functional interdependence, except to imply that it could be used 
in a support facility analysis.  The 1980 PSD Preamble expressly 
rejected it otherwise. 
Furthermore, Congress specifically prohibited oil and gas 
exploration and production facilities from being aggregated for 
the purpose of defining a major source under the section 112 
program for hazardous air pollutants (HAPs).184  Consistent with 
this statutory mandate, EPA has expressly determined that oil 
and gas field production facilities do not fit within the profile of a 
typical industrial facility.185  Because of the unique geographical 
and operational complexities inherent to the oil and oil gas 
industry, EPA looks to the surface site when determining 
whether to aggregate exploration and production facilities for 
section 112 purposes.  In its proposed rule for Oil and Gas MACT 
Standards, EPA stated, “[b]ecause the term surface site is well 
understood within the industry and easily recognizable by 
enforcement authorities, a facility definition on this basis should 
be easily implementable.  For these reasons, the EPA is proposing 
a facility definition based on surface site.”186  Accordingly, for 
section 112 major source determinations, EPA promulgated the 
definition of “facility,” which provides, “[p]ieces of production 
equipment or groupings of equipment located on different oil and 
gas leases, mineral fee tracts, lease tracts . . . [or separate surface 
sites, whether or not connected by a road, waterway, power line 
or pipeline], shall not be considered part of the . . . facility.”187  
EPA’s statement closely resembles the 1980 PSD Preamble’s 
rejection of functional interdependence in order to avoid 
 
 183. See in re Anadarko Petroleum Corp., No. VIII-2010-4, 2011 WL 3533365, 
at *16-17 (EPA 2011). 
 184. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006). 
 185. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Oil and 
Natural Gas Production and Natural Gas Transmission and Storage, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 6288, 6303 (Feb. 6, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 186. Id. 
 187. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Oil and 
Natural Gas Production and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants: Natural Gas Transmission and Storage, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,610, 32,630 
(June 17, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
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embroiling the Agency in “highly subjective” “fine-grained” 
analyses that would drain its resources.188 
Moreover, in section 112(a)(3), Congress defined “stationary 
source” as having the same meaning the definition has under 
Section 111(a) for the NSPS program.189  Similarly, the D.C. 
Circuit in Alabama Power held that the “applicable definition” for 
“source” under the PSD program “is provided in section 111.”190  
Accordingly, the definitions for “stationary source” under the 
NSR, NSPS and HAPs programs include the four component 
terms “any building, structure, facility, or installation.”  This does 
not necessarily mean that EPA’s regulatory definitions of the four 
statutory terms for “source” must be identical for separate and 
distinct regulatory programs under the CAA.  EPA has discretion 
to define statutory terms to carry out the purposes of the CAA.191  
However, EPA must define terms reasonably and it is significant 
that EPA defines oil and gas sources differently for HAPs than 
PSD review. 
As expressed in the 1980 PSD Preamble and the Oil and Gas 
MACT Standards, EPA defined “source” in a manner that would 
simplify application of the definition for industry and permitting 
authorities and avoid a highly subjective fine-grained analysis.  
In contrast to EPA’s regulatory definitions, which underwent 
public notice and comment, the concept of functional 
interdependence arose over time through various EPA office’s 
case-by-case determinations and guidance documents.  The text of 
EPA’s regulatory definition of source for PSD and the associated 
1980 PSD Preamble provides no notice to industry that facilities 
will be considered contiguous or adjacent if they are functionally 
interdependent.  Moreover, EPA looks solely to the physical 
distance and proximity of surface sites when determining 
whether oil and gas exploration and production facilities are 
 
 188. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans: Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 
Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,695 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, & 
124). 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
 190. See Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 191. Id. (“EPA has discretion to define the terms reasonably to carry out the 
intent of the Act, but not go clear beyond the scope of the Act, as it has done so 
here.”). 
37
  
682 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
 
contiguous or adjacent under the HAPs program.  Similarly, the 
HAPs program contains the same four component terms for 
“stationary source” as the PSD program.192  Therefore, it should 
be reasonable to infer that EPA will treat oil and gas exploration 
and production facilities similarly under the PSD program. 
As mentioned above, previous EPA guidance documents 
indicate that proximity is a factor in a contiguous or adjacent 
analysis.  However, the issue of proximity is framed as being only 
one factor in a broader functional interdependence analysis.  That 
is, EPA evaluates proximity to determine whether facilities are 
close enough to be functionally interdependent.  However, if this 
was EPA’s intention when it promulgated the three-part 
definition of source, it would have either listed functional 
interdependence as a factor or explained that proximity was one 
factor that should be used in a functional interdependence 
analysis to determine whether facilities are contiguous or 
adjacent.  But this is not the case.  EPA expressly rejected 
functional interdependence in the 1980 PSD Preamble and did 
not define “contiguous or adjacent” in terms other than the plain 
meaning. 
Therefore, EPA’s practice of analyzing functional 
interdependence to determine if oil and gas facilities are 
contiguous or adjacent for NSR and Title V purposes is 
unreasonable.  The plain meaning of “contiguous or adjacent” 
unambiguously connotes physical distance and proximity, and the 
1980 PSD Preamble and subsequent regulations do not indicate 
otherwise.  Conversely, the concept of functional interdependence 
arose through EPA case-by-case determinations and guidance 
documents that were not scrutinized under the public notice and 
comment requirements for agency regulations under the APA.  
Although the regulatory term “adjacent” is slightly ambiguous 
because it does not provide for a specific distance, EPA may not 
read a plainly inconsistent meaning, such as “interdependence,” 
into a term that is not otherwise defined.  Accordingly, a 
reviewing court might not give deference to an EPA source 
determination that relies on functional interdependence to 
 
 192. C.f. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (a)(3) and Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 
396 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that the “applicable definition” for “source” under 
the PSD program “is provided in section 111”). 
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determine whether oil and gas exploration and production 
facilities are contiguous or adjacent. 
B. EPA’s Interpretation Requires Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking 
Section 553 of the APA establishes a general default rule that 
requires administrative rulemaking to “observe the notice-and-
comment process.”193  However, the act expressly allows agencies 
to issue certain types of rules without providing for any form of 
public participation including “general statements of policy” and 
“interpretive rules.”194  “[P]olicy statements . . . [and interpretive 
rules] assume a variety of forms and . . . [are issued] under . . . 
[different] titles, such as ‘guidance,’ ‘memoranda,’ ‘manuals,’ 
‘policy letters,’ ‘press releases,’ ‘staff instructions,’ ‘bulletins’ and 
the like.”195  These types of documents “serve two basic 
functions.”196  First, they promote administrative consistency by 
providing guidance to agency personnel on how to apply an 
ambiguous regulation.197  Second, the documents are a tool 
“agencies [can use] to inform . . . the public of administrative 
policies and legal interpretations before the agency acts on 
them.”198 
Policy statements and interpretive rules differ 
characteristically from the legislative, or “substantive” rules for 
which the APA requires notice and comment rulemaking.199  The 
distinguishing characteristic is that “like a statute, [legislative 
rules] regulate[] private conduct with ‘the force and effect of 
law.’”200  “If valid . . . [legislative rules] create legally enforceable 
rights for or impose legal obligations on members of the public, 
 
 193. WERHAN, supra note 144, at 249. 
 194. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)(2006). 
 195. WERHAN, supra note 144, at 250. 
 196. Id. at 253. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 250. The APA uses the term “substantive rule” in section 553(d), 
but the Act does not use the term “legislative rule.”  However, the two terms are 
often used interchangeably in administrative law. Id. at 250 n.3. 
 200. Id. (citing TOM C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, at 30 n.3 (1947)). 
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[as well as] . . . bind the agency and . . . courts . . . .”201  Because of 
the legislative nature of these rules, Congress requires public 
participation before they are adopted by an agency.202  In 
contrast, “‘[s]ubstantive rights are not at stake’ in the same way 
[as] when [an] agenc[y] issue[s] [an] . . . [i]nterpretive rule[] [or a] 
. . . policy statement[] . . . because [these types of documents] . . . 
‘lack the force of law’.”203  Thus, the APA does not require public 
notice and comment procedures for policy statements and 
interpretive rules.  Accordingly, “[r]eviewing courts distinguish 
legislative rules . . . from [policy statements or interpretive rules 
by utilizing variations of a ‘legal effects’ test,] “depending on 
whether the agency claims . . . [the document at issue] is a policy 
statement or an interpretive rule.”204 
Rather than the guidance document that it purports to be, 
the McCarthy Memo is a legislative rule that requires notice and 
comment rulemaking.  Functional interdependence is not an 
expressed element in EPA’s three-part definition of “source.”  
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the concept 
cannot reasonably be inferred from the meaning of “contiguous or 
adjacent,” as set out in the 1980 PSD Preamble and subsequent 
regulations.  However, the McCarthy Memo adds functional 
interdependence as requirement to the definition of stationary 
source.  In doing so, the McCarthy Memo constitutes final agency 
action that is subject to judicial review.  Accordingly, 
notwithstanding whether EPA considers the McCarthy Memo to 
be a non-binding policy statement or an interpretive rule, the 
Memo could be challenged in court because adding functional 
interdependence to a contiguous or adjacent analysis requires 
notice and comment rulemaking. 
 
 201. WERHAN, supra note 144, at 251. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 250 (citing TOM C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 30 n.3 (1947)). 
 204. Id. at 251. 
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1. The McCarthy Memo Constitutes Final Agency 
Action 
Before reaching the issue of whether the McCarthy Memo is 
a non-binding guidance document or a legislative rule requiring 
notice and comment rulemaking, a reviewing court must 
determine whether the document constitutes “final agency 
action.”  The APA only authorizes lawsuits challenging “final 
agency action.”205  Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
devised a two-part test to determine whether an agency action is 
final, and thus subject to judicial review.  First, the agency action 
must be “the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking 
process.”206  If the agency’s action “is tentative or interlocutory,” 
it is not final.207  Second, if the administrative process is 
complete, the agency action must determine “rights or 
obligations” or have some other kind of “legal consequences” to be 
final.208 
The McCarthy Memo is not tentative or interlocutory.  The 
Memo provides explicit instructions to state permitting 
authorities and EPA Regional Offices on how they should apply 
the three regulatory criteria for the definition of “source.”209  
Even though the Memo could be subject to change (after all, it 
revoked the Wehrum Memo), a reviewing court could still 
consider it to be the completion of the administrative process.210  
As stated by the D.C. Circuit when holding a guidance document 
to be a final agency action, “the fact that a law may be altered in 
 
 205. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 206. See Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See McCarthy Memo, supra note 55, at 2. See also id. (“I withdraw the 
[Wehrum Memo], and direct permitting authorities to the three criteria for 
making source determinations specified in the existing NSR regulations.  
Regional Offices should continue to review and comment on source 
determinations to assure that permitting authorities conduct fully-reasoned 
source determinations that remain consistent with existing regulatory 
requirements and historical permitting practice.”). 
 210. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(also providing that “EPA may think that because the Guidance in all its 
particulars, is subject to change, it is not binding and therefore not final action . 
. . . But all laws are subject to change.”). 
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the future has nothing to do with whether it is subject to judicial 
review at the moment.”211  Thus, the McCarthy Memo marks the 
consummation of EPA’s decision-making process regarding the 
three-part regulatory definition of “source.” 
Accordingly, the second issue a reviewing court will consider 
is whether the McCarthy Memo determines or affects individual 
rights or obligations.  As discussed in the previous section, only 
legislative rules (e.g., regulations) that an agency promulgates in 
accordance with the procedures set out in the APA have the “force 
and effect of law.”  As such, courts may only review a guidance 
document if it has an effect similar to a legislative rule, which is 
legally binding on an agency and the courts. 
The D.C. Circuit confronted this precise issue in Appalachian 
Power.212  In that case, the court of appeals reviewed the validity 
of an EPA guidance document entitled “Periodic Monitoring 
Guidance.”  Under its authority granted by the CAA, EPA 
promulgated a regulation requiring certain states to include 
“periodic monitoring” as a condition in a stationary source’s Title 
V operating permit.213  Subsequently, EPA issued the disputed 
guidance document, which elaborated the “periodic monitoring” 
requirements.214  In the document, EPA instructed its personnel 
to follow the guidance when reviewing permits, and insisted that 
state and local permitting authorities comply with the guidance 
document when establishing the terms and conditions of the Title 
V permit.215  EPA argued that its guidance document was not 
final because it was not binding.216  However, the court of appeals 
disagreed: 
If an agency acts as if a document issued at headquarters is 
controlling in the field, if it treats the document in the same 
manner as it treats a legislative rule, if it bases enforcement 
actions on the policies or interpretations formulated in the 
document, if it leads private parties or State permitting 
authorities to believe that it will declare permits invalid unless 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1017-18. 
 214. Id. at 1019-20. 
 215. Id. at 1022. 
 216. Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1020. 
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they comply with the terms of the document, then the agency’s 
document is for all practical purposes “binding.”217 
Under these premises, the court of appeals determined that “[the 
guidance document] . . . reads like a ukase.  It commands, it 
requires, it orders, it dictates.  Through the Guidance, EPA has 
given the States their ‘marching orders’ and EPA expects the 
States to fall in line.”218  Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held the 
guidance document constituted final agency action because it 
“reflect[ed] a settled agency position which has legal 
consequences both for State agencies administering their permit 
programs and for companies . . . [that] must obtain Title V 
permits in order to continue operating.”219 
One could argue that the McCarthy Memo is a non-binding 
guidance document that does not have legal consequences.  The 
memo states that it withdraws the Wehrum Memo, and instead 
“re-emphasi[zes] the fundamental criteria for making source 
determinations as specified in [EPA’s] existing NSR regulations, 
explained in the preamble to [EPA’s] 1980 promulgation of those 
regulations and demonstrated through historical practice in 
making source determinations in these programs.”220  Thus, it 
would seem that the McCarthy Memo is merely a non-binding 
guidance document because it purports to do no more than 
require permitting authorities to apply the criteria set forth in 
the regulations and Preamble. 
However, upon closer examination, the McCarthy Memo 
implicitly adds the requirement of functional interdependence.  
The McCarthy Memo points to prior EPA “case-by-case 
determinations [that] illustrate the kind of reasoned decision-
making that is necessary to justify adequately a permitting 
authority’s source determination decision.”221  However, as 
previously discussed, these prior determinations evaluate the 
functional interdependence between facilities to determine 
 
 217. Id. at 1021 (citing Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy 
Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like- Should Federal Agencies Use 
them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1328-29 (1992)). 
 218. Id. at 1023. 
 219. Id. 
 220. McCarthy Memo, supra note 55, at 1. 
 221. Id. at 2. 
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whether they are contiguous or adjacent.  Moreover, the memo 
explains, “After conducting the necessary analysis, it may be that, 
in some cases, ‘proximity’ may serve as the overwhelming factor 
in a permitting authority’s source determination decision.  
However, such a conclusion can only be justified through 
reasoned decision making after examining whether other factors 
are relevant to the analysis.”222  Here, the memo unequivocally 
states that proximity is not the sole factor used to determine 
whether facilities are contiguous or adjacent, as the plain 
meaning and 1980 PSD Preamble would suggest.  Instead, the 
memo implies that proximity is one factor in a broader functional 
interdependence analysis for the contiguous or adjacent 
requirement.  Therefore, the McCarthy Memo either adds a 
fourth requirement to the definition of source, or expands the 
contiguous or adjacent criteria beyond the plain meaning 
prescribed by the regulation and 1980 PSD Preamble. 
Consequently, the McCarthy Memo consummates EPA’s 
position that functional interdependence is an added requirement 
for a permitting authority’s source determination.  As in 
Appalachian Power, this added requirement has legal 
consequences for state permitting authorities and companies that 
must obtain construction and operating permits.  The McCarthy 
memo concludes by stating: 
I withdraw the [Wehrum Memo] . . . and direct permitting 
authorities to the three criteria for making source determinations 
specified in the existing NSR regulations.  Regional Offices 
should continue to review and comment on source determinations 
to assure that permitting authorities conduct fully-reasoned 
source determinations that remain consistent with existing 
regulatory requirements and historical permitting practice.223 
This passage is significant for two reasons.  First, in the context 
of the memo, the instruction to make “fully-reasoned source 
determinations . . . consistent with . . . historical permitting 
practice”224 implies that state and local permitting authorities 
 
 222. Id. (emphasis added). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
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must use the concept of functional interdependence instead of 
relying solely on proximity to determine if facilities are 
contiguous or adjacent.  Second, the memo essentially directs 
EPA Regional Offices to reject state or local source 
determinations that do not use functional interdependence.  This 
is illustrated in the previously discussed source determinations in 
MacClarence and In re Anadarko,225 where EPA did in fact 
overturn the state permitting authorities’ initial decisions 
because they based their contiguous or adjacent determinations 
on proximity rather than functional interdependence.  Also, as 
discussed in Summit,226 EPA Region 5 rejected Summit’s 
proximity argument to conclude that its wells and gas sweetening 
plant were functionally interdependent.  Each of the EPA 
Regional Offices in MacClarence, In re Anadarko, and Summit 
cite the McCarthy Memo as a basis for their decisions.  Moreover, 
as demonstrated by the Wyoming, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and 
Texas source definitions, the States prefer to use proximity as the 
primary factor when determining whether a source is contiguous 
or adjacent, and appear to only reticently provide for functional 
interdependence in order to acknowledge the McCarthy Memo.  
Therefore, as in Appalachian Power, the McCarthy Memo 
commands, requires, orders, and dictates.  It gives the States 
their “marching orders” to fall in line with functional 
interdependence.  Like a legislative rule, it is a binding document 
from which legal consequences will follow.  The McCarthy Memo 
obligates state and local permitting authorities to follow its 
guidance, and affects the individual rights of companies seeking a 
NSR or Title V permit. 
Accordingly, by revoking the Wehrum Memo, the McCarthy 
Memo is a binding document that consummates EPA’s position on 
the definition of “stationary source,” which goes beyond the scope 
of the regulations to require functional interdependence as a 
factor in source determinations.227  As a result, the memo 
determines rights and obligations, constituting final agency 
action that is subject to judicial review. 
 
 225. See supra Parts III-D-1 & 3. 
 226. See supra Part III-D-2. 
 227. See McCarthy Memo, supra note 55 
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2. Functional Interdependence Requires Notice 
and Comment Rulemaking 
The McCarthy Memo interprets the regulatory definition of 
stationary source to include functional interdependence.  
However, the memo does not state whether it purports to be a 
policy statement or an interpretive rule.  Policy statements are 
“issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the 
manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary 
function.”228  On the other hand, interpretive rules are “issued by 
an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the 
statutes and rules which it administers.”229  Because of the 
distinctions between policy statements and interpretive rules, 
courts sometimes use slightly different analyses for 
distinguishing the two types of guidance documents from 
legislative rules that require public notice and comment.230  
However, the McCarthy memo does not present this issue.  As 
explained by the D.C. Circuit in Appalachian Power: 
[W]hatever EPA may think of its guidance generally, the 
elements of the Guidance petitioners challenge consist of the 
agency’s settled position, a position it plans to follow in reviewing 
State-issued permits, a position it will insist State and local 
authorities comply with in setting the terms and conditions of 
permits issued to petitioners, a position EPA officials in the field 
are bound to apply.231 
Accordingly, the court of appeals analyzed the guidance document 
at issue as if it was an interpretive rule.232  Similarly, a court 
challenge of the McCarthy Memo should pertain to EPA’s settled 
position that functional interdependence is a requirement for 
source determinations, a position the McCarthy Memo instructs 
permitting authorities to follow and for EPA Regional Offices to 
 
 228. WERHAN, supra note 144, at 253 (quoting Attorney General’s Manual on 
the Administrative Procedure Act, at 30 n.3 (1947), reprinted in WILLIAM F. 
FUNK, ET AL., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 33-171 (3d ed. 
2000)). 
 229. Id. at 257. 
 230. Id. at 253. 
 231. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 232. Id. at 1024. 
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review in state-issued permits.  Thus, the issue is whether the 
McCarthy Memo’s interpretation of the regulatory definition of 
“stationary source” requires the public notice and comment 
procedures required under the APA. 
Whether a particular agency guidance document is 
legislative rule requiring notice and comment or an interpretive 
rule exempt from such requirements is a highly fact-specific 
inquiry.233  The central inquiry is whether the guidance 
document itself creates or modifies a legal right or obligation or 
merely explains or clarifies provisions in a regulation.234  The 
guidance document may do no more than “spell[] out a duty fairly 
encompassed within the regulation that the interpretation 
purports to construe.”235  In other words, a reviewing court will 
uphold an agency interpretation if it “supplies crisper and more 
detailed lines than the authority being interpreted” without 
creating a new and distinct standard of conduct.236  Accordingly, 
a reviewing court should compare the language of the regulation 
or statute with the agency’s interpretation: “The distinction 
between an interpretive rule and [a legislative] rule more likely 
turns on how tightly the agency’s interpretation is drawn 
linguistically from the actual language of the statute or rule.”237 
The D.C. Circuit scrutinized an agency’s interpretation of a 
regulation in an influential case, Paralyzed Veterans of America 
v. D.C. Arena L.R.  In Paralyzed Veterans, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act contained an ambiguous provision that required 
certain newly constructed facilities to be “readily accessible to 
and usable by individuals with disabilities.”238  Under its 
rulemaking authority granted by the Act, the Justice Department 
promulgated a regulation requiring newly constructed facilities to 
include wheelchair seating that provided “lines of sight 
 
 233. American Hospital Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 234. Id. at 1045. 
 235. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). 
 236. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 237. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 117 F.3d at 588. 
 238. Id. at 580 (internal quotations omitted, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(a)(1) 
(1994)). 
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comparable to those for members of the general public.”239  
Subsequently, in a manual published without public notice and 
comment, the Justice Department interpreted “lines of sight 
comparable” to require sightlines over standing spectators in 
circumstances such as a sports arena, where spectators can be 
expected to stand at times.240  The court of appeals found that the 
interpretation in the manual had been “driven by the actual 
meaning [the Justice Department] ascribe[d] to the phrase ‘lines 
of sight comparable.’”241  Thus, the legal basis of the Justice 
Department’s interpretation was the legislative rule it had issued 
pursuant to public notice and comment.  Stated differently, “the 
government arguably could have relied on the regulation itself, 
even without the manual interpretation, to seek lines of sight 
over standing spectators.”242 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held 
that the Justice Department’s interpretation was “not sufficiently 
distinct or additive to the regulation to require notice and 
comment.”243 
On the other hand, in Appalachian Power, the D.C. Circuit 
set aside EPA’s Periodic Monitoring Guidance because it 
improperly revised prior EPA regulations without following 
proper notice and comment rulemaking procedures.  In that case, 
EPA promulgated a regulation providing for monitoring and 
testing of stationary sources.  Specifically, the regulation at issue 
required “periodic monitoring” as a condition to a source’s Title V 
operating permit when the applicable state or federal emissions 
standard for a particular source did not provide for “periodic 
testing or instrumental or noninstrumental monitoring.”244 The 
heart of the issue was the ambiguous definition of “periodic 
monitoring,” and what the term required.  The disputed guidance 
document interpreted “periodic monitoring” to require states to 
evaluate the adequacy of all monitoring requirements, and that 
states must require additional monitoring if the existing 
monitoring requirements did not provide the “necessary 
 
 239. Id. at 581 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36 app. A (1996)). 
 240. Id. at 582. 
 241. Id. at 588 (citing Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112). 
 242. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 588. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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assurance of compliance.”245  However, Petitioners argued that if 
“periodic monitoring” had its usual meaning, any emission 
standard requiring monitoring or testing “from time to time – 
that is yearly, monthly, weekly, daily, or hourly – would be 
satisfactory,” and that the regulation required no further re-
evaluation of the monitoring or testing requirements to ensure 
compliance with applicable air quality standards.246  The court of 
appeals examined the language of the regulation and the 
guidance document and concluded that the regulation did not 
require states to revise existing monitoring requirements in 
addition to creating periodic monitoring requirements for 
emission standards that lacked recurring monitoring 
requirements.247 
In support of its conclusion, the D.C. Circuit in Appalachian 
Power found that EPA’s interpretation of the regulation in the 
guidance document was inconsistent with other statements EPA 
made at the time the Title V regulations were promulgated.248  
First, the court of appeals observed that in response to comments 
in the Title V regulations preamble, EPA stated that if there was 
“any federally promulgated requirement with insufficient 
monitoring, EPA will issue a rulemaking to revise such 
requirement.”249  However, the court of appeals noted that 
instead of promulgating a new rule as promised, EPA issued the 
guidance document without public notice and comment.250  
Second, the court of appeals pointed out that the Title V permit 
regulations state, “Title V does not impose substantive new 
requirements.”251  The court of appeals found that: 
Test methods and the frequency of testing for compliance with 
emission limitations are surely “substantive” requirements; they 
impose duties and obligations on those who are regulated . . . We 
have recognized before that changing the method of measuring 
 
 245. Id. at 1025. 
 246. Id. at 1024. 
 247. Id. at 1028. 
 248. Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1024-27. 
 249. Id. at 1025. 
 250. Id. at 1024. 
 251. Id. at 1026 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 70.1(b) (2000)). 
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compliance with an emission limitation can affect the stringency 
of the limitation itself.252 
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that regulatory history 
failed to demonstrate that the rule at issue “initially had the 
broad scope the Guidance now ascribes to it.”253  Because the 
guidance document required states to re-evaluate existing 
monitoring requirements, it created new substantive 
requirements contrary to the Title V regulations and associated 
preamble.  Thus, the D.C. Circuit struck down the Periodic 
Monitoring Guidance in its entirety.254 
Similar to Appalachian Power, the regulatory history of the 
definition of source, as illustrated by the 1980 PSD Preamble and 
the text of the regulation itself, conflicts with subsequent EPA 
applications of functional interdependence to determine if 
facilities are contiguous or adjacent.  By prescribing the use of 
functional interdependence, the McCarthy Memo either 
mistakenly concludes that the three criteria for “source” are 
interchangeable, unreasonably expands the definition of 
“contiguous or adjacent” beyond the plain meaning denoted in the 
regulatory history, or erroneously adds a fourth criterion not 
expressed in the text of the regulation. 
Therefore, the McCarthy Memo does not “suppl[y] crisper 
and more detailed lines” than the regulatory definition of 
source.255  It creates a new and distinct standard of conduct.  
Accordingly, unlike the guidance manual at issue in Paralyzed 
Veterans, the McCarthy Memo’s implicit requirement of 
functional interdependence for source determinations is 
“sufficiently distinct or additive to the regulation to require notice 
and comment.”256 
 
 252. Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1027 (citing Portland Cement Ass’n 
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
 253. Id. at 1026. 
 254. Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1028. 
 255. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 256. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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VI. NEW SOURCE REVIEW CIRCUMVENTION 
When an operator of an oil and gas facility decides to 
construct a new facility or modify an existing facility that emits 
regulated air pollutants, it must determine what type of permit to 
obtain for said facility.  New or modified sources with low 
emission levels might only require a state minor source permit, 
while sources with emissions that exceed CAA major source 
thresholds would require NSR.  However, determining which 
permitting path to follow becomes more complicated when 
functionally interdependent sources are aggregated. 
A. Modifications to an Existing Major Source 
Aggregation of oil and gas exploration and production 
facilities on a large scale basis can result in unintended 
consequences.  For example, assume a natural gas production 
field is located in an area designated attainment for all criteria 
pollutants.  A permitting authority decides to aggregate all of the 
emissions activities for one operator within the entire natural gas 
field for PSD review and Title V permitting purposes.  This 
means all of the gas wells, compressor stations, combustion 
equipment, separator tanks, etc. are aggregated into a single 
source.  Individually, the above-described emissions activities do 
not exceed major source thresholds, but they do collectively. 
Under the CAA, PSD review applies, among other 
circumstances, when a major source proposes to undergo a 
modification (i.e. a physical change or change in method of 
operation)257 that will result in both (1) a defined “significant 
emissions increase” of a regulated NSR pollutant; and (2) a 
significant “net emissions increase” of that pollutant from the 
major source.258 
Accordingly, the first step in determining if PSD review 
applies is to determine what emissions increases, without 
considering decreases, will be associated with the proposed 
modification. Modifications that do not result in emissions 
increases above established significance levels generally do not 
 
 257. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.21(b)(2)(iii). 
 258. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(23), (b)(40), and (b)(50). 
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have to undergo PSD review.  State regulations typically define 
significance levels, but some of the federal standards are as 
follows: Carbon Monoxide – 100 tpy; Nitrous Oxides – 40 tpy; 
Sulfur dioxide – 40 tpy; Ozone – 40 tpy of VOCs, etc.259  In the 
above-described hypothetical facts, many of the emissions 
activities would not exceed these significance levels.  Thus, over 
time, the operator could add a natural gas well, build a new 
separator tank, and the like, thereby increasing the overall 
emissions levels for the aggregated single “major source” without 
ever triggering PSD review. 
Furthermore, under the second step of PSD review, if there is 
a significant emissions increase, the operator must determine if 
the proposed modification will result in a “net” emissions 
increase.260  The emissions netting analysis is a complex process, 
but can be summarized as follows. A net emissions increase 
equals: all emissions increases associated with the modification, 
minus all source-wide creditable contemporaneous emissions 
decreases, plus all source-wide creditable contemporaneous 
increases.261 
There are many complex nuances for each of the netting 
requirements, but in the end, if the net emissions increase does 
not exceed a significance level for one of the listed pollutants, 
PSD review does not apply.  Thus, even if one of the operator’s 
proposed modifications exceeded a significant emissions level, the 
operator could still avoid PSD review by netting out emissions 
decreases from other emissions units within the single 
aggregated source. 
B. Circumvention 
Although it seems as if the operator in the above-described 
hypothetical could increase his overall emissions levels without 
triggering NSR, the operator may not avoid NSR by breaking a 
single project into smaller minor projects to avoid significant 
emissions thresholds for PSD review.  In a June 28, 1989 Federal 
Register notice, EPA stated that it is not only improper, but also 
 
 259. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(23)(i). 
 260. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(3). 
 261. See id. 
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a violation of the CAA to construct a source or major modification 
with a minor source permit when there is intent to operate as a 
major source.262  EPA went on to state: 
It is not possible to set forth, in detail, the circumstances in 
which EPA considers an owner or operator to have evaded 
preconstruction review in this way, and thus subjected itself to 
enforcement sanctions under sections 113 and 167 from the 
beginning of construction. This is ultimately a question of intent. 
However, EPA will look to objective indicia to establish that 
intent.263 
Thus, EPA considers a deliberate attempt to circumvent the NSR 
process to be a sham permit application, which can result in civil 
and criminal penalties. 
Although EPA could not define what particular 
circumstances would lead to a circumvention determination, the 
Agency expressed that the central inquiry would be intent.  
Factors establishing intent have been set out in an influential 
EPA memorandum regarding 3M’s Maplewood research and 
development facility (the “3M Maplewood Memo”).  In the memo, 
EPA explains the criteria it will consider when determining 
whether a source is circumventing major NSR by obtaining minor 
source permits for its modifications: 
1. Filing of more than one minor source or minor modification 
application associated with emissions increases at a single plant 
within a short period of time. 
2. Application of [the source’s] funding [to the project]. 
3. Reports of consumer demand and projected production levels. 
4. Statements of authorized representatives of the source 
regarding plans for operation. 
5. EPA’s own analysis of the economic realities of the projects 
considered together.264 
 
 262. Requirements for the Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 54 
Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,281 (June 28, 1989) (codified at C.F.R. pts. 51 and 52). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Memorandum from John B. Rasnic, Director, Office of Air Quality 
Planning and Standards, to George T. Czerniak, Chief, Air Enforcement Branch, 
EPA Region 5, Applicability of New Source Review Circumvention Guidance to 
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The 3M Maplewood Memo is referenced in numerous other EPA 
circumvention determination memos and guidance documents, 
and currently represents EPA’s stance regarding 
circumvention.265 
However, similar to the concept of functional 
interdependence in source determinations, the factors described 
in the 3M Maplewood Memo evolved over time through case-by-
case applicability determinations and guidance documents.  In 
2006, EPA proposed a circumvention rule in order to clarify and 
simplify the determination process, and the rule was finalized in 
2009.266  However, in 2010, EPA delayed the effective date of the 
final rule indefinitely.  Thus, EPA will likely continue to use the 
factors expressed in the 3M Maplewood Memo in the foreseeable 
future. 
C. Circumvention Applied to Oil and Gas Facilities 
EPA’s NSR circumvention policy could have significant 
implications for the oil and gas industry if EPA continues to apply 
functional interdependence to its aggregation analysis.  Once a 
group of interdependent oil and gas facilities are aggregated, 
operators of the aggregated facilities would need to be concerned 
about whether they are circumventing NSR every time they 
decide to drill a new well, build a tank, or add some other kind of 
small emissions unit.  When the operator decides to build or 
modify these types of facilities it must decide whether to undergo 
NSR or merely obtain a minor source permit for said facility. 
 
3M – Maplewood, Minnesota (June 1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ 
nsr/gen/u3-18.txt [hereinafter “3M Maplewood Memo”]. 
 265. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment 
New Source Review (NSR): Aggregation; Reconsideration, 75 Fed. Reg. 19567-
01, 19570 (Apr. 15, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51 and 52) (citing 
Memorandum from Darryl Tyler, Director, EPA Office of Air Quality Planning 
and Standards, to David Kee, Director, Air Management Division, EPA Region 
5, Applicability of PSD to Portions of Plan Constructed in Phases Without 
Permits (Oct. 21, 1986); Memorandum from Doug Cole, EPA, to Grant Cooper 
and Raymond McKay, PSD Applicability for Frederick Power, L.P. (Oct. 12, 
2001)). 
 266. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment 
New Source Review (NSR): Aggregation and Project Netting, 74 Fed. Reg. 2376 
(Jan. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51 and 52). 
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Because obtaining a federal construction or operating permit 
is considered a rulemaking, an operator’s facilities will be subject 
to public notice and comment if it chooses the NSR or Title V 
permitting path.  As demonstrated by MacClarence, Summit, and 
In re Anadarko, attempting to obtain a federal permit entails a 
complicated analysis of a facilities’ functional interdependence, 
and obtaining a permit can involve years of negotiations between 
the operator, state permitting authority, and EPA, not to mention 
delays from court challenges by environmental activist groups or 
concerned citizens.  In the oil and gas industry, the issue of 
timing can mean the difference between a well getting drilled or 
not.  Every oil and gas lease has a primary term that will expire 
at some point.  As primary term expiration dates approach, 
lessees will have to weigh their options between state minor 
source permit requirements, federal permitting requirements, 
and the consequences of NSR circumvention. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As a result of EPA’s application of functional 
interdependence to the contiguous or adjacent analysis of oil and 
gas facilities, operators of such facilities are faced with a difficult 
choice.  As they develop oil and gas fields, operators have two 
options.  They can obtain NSR or Title V permits for their 
functionally interdependent facilities and subject themselves to 
the complications and delays involved with the federal permitting 
requirements.  On the other hand, an operator could choose to 
forego the federal requirements and apply for a straightforward 
state minor source permit.  However, if operators choose the 
latter option, they should be wary of NSR circumvention.  If the 
permitting authority believes the operator is circumventing the 
federal permitting requirements, a lengthy court battle will be 
inevitable and the operator risks severe fines and possible 
criminal liability. 
So far, EPA has declined to apply functional interdependence 
to entire oil fields, but the broad concept could allow for such an 
interpretation.  Moreover, the risk of NSR circumvention might 
force more operators to apply for federal construction and 
operating permits.  This would present an obstacle to exploration 
and development activities as operators wait for permits and 
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production costs increase.  Consequently, the current booming 
production rate that is one of few bright spots in our struggling 
economy would slow to a grinding pace with little or no added 
environmental benefit. 
As in the cases discussed above, various courts have held 
that guidance is not a substitute for rulemaking.  Neither the text 
of the regulatory definition of “stationary source” nor the 1980 
PSD Preamble support the concept of functional interdependence 
as applied to a contiguous or adjacent analysis.  Thus, if EPA 
continues to apply the standards set forth in the McCarthy 
Memo, oil and gas operators could respond with a court challenge.  
EPA should either produce a guidance document that articulates 
reliance on proximity as the primary factor in a contiguous or 
adjacent analysis, as reflected in the 1980 PSD Preamble, or 
subject its functional interdependence test to the notice and 
comment rulemaking procedures required under the APA. 
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